DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

CANADA

OPERATIONAL RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS ESTABLISHMENT

ORAE PROJECT REPORT NO. PR142

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 1955-1975

by

G. Kamoff-Nicolsky

DIRECTORATE OF STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

ORAE Project Reports present the considered results of project analyses to sponsors and interested agencies in an expeditious manner. They do not necessarily represent the official views of the Canadian Department of National Defence.

OTTAWA, CANADA

MAY, 1980

THIS DOCUMENT

IS ISSUED UNDER

ORAE PROJECT 96103

REGIONAL STUDIES OF STRATEGIC

INTEREST TO CANADA

Approved by: M. A. Grant, Director

for CHIEF, OPERATIONAL RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS ESTABLISHMENT

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 1955-1975

PART I

ABSTRACT

In order to facilitate judgement of reports pertaining to current Soviet policies and activities particularly in relation to Iran and Afghanistan, portions of the subject major ORAE study, which is still in the production stage, are to be issued as a series of Project Reports.

Part I deals with the post-World War II period covering the initial Soviet success in circumventing Allied rim-land strategy and the subsequent Soviet penetration of North Africa and the Middle East. The report also provides a review and assessment of related literature. Evidence of preconception, bias and the repeated use of data to substantiate pre-determined conclusions strongly suggests concentrated efforts to mould public opinion through the manipulation of information. Such activity has blunted the potential positive effects of the all too rare, publically disseminated studies based on objective research.

LA POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE DE L'URSS EN AFRIQUE DU NORD ET AU MOYEN-ORIENT DE 1955 A 1975

PARTIE I

RÉSUMÉ

Afin de faciliter l'évaluation des rapports sur les activités politiques de l'URSS en Iran et en Afghanistan notamment, des parties de la grande étude faite actuellement par le CAR Op seront publiées en série.

La Partie I de cette étude porte sur la période d'après la Seconde guerre mondiale et décrit comment l'URSS après avoir d'abord réussi à circonvenir la stratégie périphérique des Alliés, s'est infiltrée ensuite en Afrique du Nord et au Moyen-Orient. Cette étude contient aussi une bibliographie critique sur ce sujet. Une partialité évidente et à plusieurs reprises la citation de documents à l'appui de conclusions préétablies suggèrent beaucoup une très nette volonté de façonner l'opinion publique en manipulant les informations. Une telle façon d'agir a émoussé les effets éventuels de la publication de trop rares études faites avec impartialité.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Abstract	i
Résumé	ii
Table of Contents	iii
Preface	iv
The Historical Setting	1
Chart I - Containment	5
Chart II - The Break-through	6
The State of the Art: Literature Interpretation, Perception and Effect	7
Introduction	7
Research: The Initial Phase	8
A Question of Perception	13
Containment - Provocation or Necessity?	13
Soviet Leadership - Good, Bad or Indifferent	14
Good or Evil - A Question of Opinion?	16
Ideology - A Live or a Dead Issue?	20
The Middle East and North Africa - Conflicting Truths	22
Western Coverage - A Question of Conscience	24
Fact or Interpretation?	25
Zionism - Soviet, Israeli, Arab and Other Viewpoints	29
Ideology - A Factor in Soviet Middle East Policy?	30
The Middle East - An Arab Perspective of Perception	31
Peace in the Middle East - Welcome But?	33
Interpretation - In Relation to the Soviet Union	34
Interpretation - In Relation to the Middle East	36
The State of the Art - Conclusions	37
Footnotes	41
Bibliography	55

PREFACE

This research project was carried out in a calendar year during which the author was in residence as a Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (SIA), Carleton University. On loan from the Department of National Defence (DND) and the recipient of a grant from the Office of the Chief of the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment (ORAE), it was possible to devote full energy to a task which grew in scope and depth as each item analyzed opened the way or established the need for further investigation and research. Much is left to do; for in such a project, there is no definite beginning nor is there a positive conclusion.

The period at SIA permitted the freedom of access to academic establishments both in Canada and abroad. Within Carleton University, the author is indebted to many. Among them are the former Director of the Norman Paterson Centre, the late Professor P.E. Uren, the successive Directors of the SIA, Professors Michael Fry and John Sigler, General E.L.M. Burns, Professors Arnold C. Smith and Harold von Riekhoff, Visiting Professors Peter Nailor, Milton Leitenberg, David Pollack and Karl Jacobsen, Professors Carter L. Elwood and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, the Director of Soviet and East European Studies, Professor Carl McMillan, Mrs. Jane Beaumont of the SIA Resource Centre and two Research Assistants, Rudolf Karnet and Craig McNaughton. Among those who helped at other academic and academic-related institutions were Professors John Erickson of Edinburgh, Alec Nove, Victor Kusin and Hannes Adomeit of Glasgow, Philip Windsor of London, B. Zimmerman and Bill Ballis of Michigan, John Gellner of York, Adam Bromke of McMasters, Franklyn Griffiths of Toronto, Michael Brecher, Donald Little, Ahmad Abu Hakima and Micham Djait of McGill, Nils Orvik of Queen's,

Robin Ranger of St. Francis Xavier, A. Legault of Laval and Ken Myers of Georgetown. Invaluable assistance was provided by Malcolm Mackintosh, Brigadier K. Hunt, Arthur Alexander, Peter Uffen and Wolfgang Mallman of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, Ian Smart of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and Bob Reford of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. In addition senior foreign visitors, including Soviet and Chinese, to Carleton University, on hearing of the project, proffered their personal views. These are only some of the many who freely gave time, counsel and information during personal interviews. Doctors James Kurth, Yair Evron, Steven Baker, Lawrence Scheinman, Paul Jabber, Alan Dowty, Roger Pajak, Ann Cohan, Mary Kalder, Robert Harkavy, James Foster, Fred Gottheil, Abraham Becker, Gabriel Sheffer, Don Peretz and Walid Khalidi (all of whom attended the 1977 Cornell Middle East Conference) provided an extremely useful insight into conflicting perceptions both in their presentations and in discussions.

There were in addition members of Canadian government establishments, including External Affairs and National Defence, who contributed tremendously with suggestions pertaining to coverage and interpretation. Sixty-three representatives of foreign nations provided extremely valuable insight into perceptions of national and international developments related to the project. They spoke freely and were, in most cases, anxious to record their views. However, almost all requested a caveat of non-identification of source, even though the information they provided was, as are all data incorporated into this manuscript, unclassified. The author will be eternally grateful for the direct exposure to the divergent international interpretations of the same events and the conflicting assessments of actors, which emerged during these interviews.

It was the original intention to issue the entire study as a DND publication, and with some modifications as a Ph.D. thesis. Conflicting priorities and related problems inherent in the production of a project of such dimensions delayed completion. However recent controversy, pertaining to Soviet actions in the Third World, provided the stimulus to re-examine the draft report.

As a result, action has now been taken to issue the full study in stages. This, therefore, is the first of a series of ORAE Project Reports which in sequence will cover the subject of "Soviet Policies and Programmes in North Africa and the Middle East - 1955/75". It is hoped that the publications will facilitate factual interpretation of Soviet objectives as they relate to Afghanistan and other areas of Moscow-initiated activity.

This report deals with the historical setting and the "current state of the art" as it applies to almost all relevant secondary source material. Subsequent reports in this series will deal with research methodology designed to reduce the adverse effects of bias and preconception which are characteristic of much of the past and contemporary literature relating to controversial subjects. The USSR, the Middle East and the rest of the Third World are prime examples.

Soviet foreign policy covering short and long term objectives, formulation procedures, participating agencies and strategic, tactical, geopolitical, historical, ideological, nationalistic, economic and other considerations are to be dealt with in the third report. The characteristics of individual Middle East and North African states as they have influenced the Soviet decision-making process will be included in a separate report.

The many occasions where the short term objectives of newly independent states and those of the USSR tended to coincide formed a clearly identifiable pattern. The fact was apparently unnoticed, or even worse rejected by most Western governments and errors which contributed to the trend were repeated.

The consistency, predictability, flexibility and opportunistic nature of the Soviet methodology employed in the implementation of policy and programmes, together with identification of the Soviet agencies involved, are to be covered in a combined issue.

A summation of all the reports together with the final conclusions will complete the series.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 1955-1975

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

1. The post World War II deterioration[1] of relations between the Western and Communist Bloc countries led to Western measures designed not only to deter perceived Soviet intent to initiate military aggression,[2] but also to prevent the anticipated and feared spread of Communist economic and political influence.[3] The Western efforts to contain the USSR were facilitated by the Moscow recognition of American nuclear power,[4] and by USSR pre-occupation with the absorption of the East European countries overrun by Soviet troops during the latter stages of hostilities.[5] In addition, priority was given by Stalin to the re-establishment of full centralized control of those areas of the USSR which had gained varying degrees of autonomy during the periods of enemy occupation.[6]

2. The Western defence measures included the formation of a series of inter-linking and overlapping alliances[7] on the entire periphery of the then more or less cohesive Communist Bloc. In Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which emerged initially from Allied forces based in the American, British and French zones of occupied Germany, was tasked with sealing off the borders of East European territories which had come under Soviet military jurisdiction. The NATO alliance stretched from Norway in the north to Turkey in the south. United States and Canadian forces augmented the indigenous European formations. And, the United States established additional European strategic facilities in anti-Communist Spain.

3. The northern areas of the Western Hemisphere were closed to potential Soviet penetration by the US Continental Air Defence Command (CONAD), which was later augmented by the creation of the Northern Air Defence Command (NORAD). NORAD incorporated a Canadian interceptor force and additional early warning systems. The responsibility for maritime defence was assigned to the Supreme Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) and to the respective Canadian and American Commanders in the Pacific. These defences were backed by the bomber component of the US Strategic Command (SAC) and, subsequently, by its inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) forces.

4. The southern areas of the hemisphere were linked in alliance by the RIO Treaty and the Organization of American States (OAS). Moreover, the continued application by the United States of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine assured unilateral American military action to counter any real or perceived Communist threat.

5. The Mediterranean area was defended in depth.[8] NATO was extended by the Baghdad Pact. And, when the revolution in Iraq brought about that country's withdrawal, the Pact was succeeded by the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).[9] The forces committed to both alliances were supported by US, British and French tactical and strategic formations and logistic reserves. These were located in or rapidly deployable to controlled bases and facilities in Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Morocco, Algeria,[10] Libya, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Aden and in the Persian Gulf.[11, 12, 13]

6. Bilateral treaties between the United States and Britain and Iran extended the encirclement policy to tie in with alliances linking the adjacent Asian states.

7. South Asia was defended against possible Soviet encroachment by a series of military agreements. These included British and American defence arrangements with Afghanistan, a US agreement with Pakistan and British protocols with India and Sri Lanka (Ceylon).

8. In South East Asia, the British had defence pacts with Burma, Singapore and Malaya; the French had agreements with Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam; and, the United States had military commitments with Thailand. The subsequent French defeat in Vietnam and withdrawal, increased United States area involvement. The formation of the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) tied in Australia and New Zealand to more active defence participation.

9. In the Far East, United States defence ties with the Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan were strengthened by American strategic, tactical and logistic installations in Hawaii, Guam and Australia. Lines of communication and supply through such facilities ensured the rapid augmentation of forces committed in the area to the Allied containment policy.

10. Even greater depth and flexibility were provided, to the Allied formations assigned to the rimland strategy role,[14] by the Royal and United States navies operating unchallenged in the North Sea, in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans, in the Mediterranean, the Suez, the Malacca Straits and in the South China Sea. Communist navies constrained by the British and American fleet presence and superiority, operated primarily in their coastal waters and in the Black Sea.

11. The Western domination of areas on the periphery of the Communist Bloc, particularly in North Africa, the Middle East and in Asia, was such that it included the capability to influence the political, economic and military orientation of colonial possessions and of newly independent states.[15] Indigenous Communist elements were supressed effectively and the USSR lacked both the access and the capability to play even a minor role in determining or influencing the policies of in-area states.[16]

12. Such was the situation in mid-1955. The Communist Bloc was contained effectively. It was a land mass surrounded by a military cordon - a much more effective "iron curtain" than the one attributed to Moscow by Churchill. The Allied encirclement of the Soviet Union, depicted in Chart I, constrained the Soviet forces to USSR controlled territory.

13. The initial Soviet break through the Allied perimeter defence system occurred during late 1955.[17, 18] Following an arms argeement,[19] negotiated in Prague between Soviet and Egyptian representatives,[20] a Soviet military mission was established in Cairo.[21] This development was followed shortly thereafter by further arms agreements[22] and by new aid and trade pacts with President Nasser.[23] The USSR then moved quickly to arrange similar arrangements with other North African and Middle East states.[24]

14. The southern flank of NATO and the Baghdad Pact had been by-passed by the Russians. A Soviet presence was established and took root outside the Allied containing walls.[25]

15. Over the next few years, this unique development became a regular occurrence[26] in most areas on the periphery of the Communist Bloc.[27] Only NATO Europe, North America and the Far East were exceptions.

CONTAINMENT



CHART I

CHART II

THE BREAK-THROUGH



16. The changes outlined above and graphically depicted in Chart II did not just happen. The Soviet leadership had found all aspects of the Western containment policy intolerable[28] and had successfully initiated action, short of direct hostilities, to overcome the Western rimland strategy.[29]

THE STATE OF THE ART: LITERATURE, INTERPRETATION, PERCEPTION AND EFFECT

Introduction

17. The post-World War II Allied encirclement of the Communist land mass and the 1955 initial Soviet breakthrough are historical events of such magnitude that they, of necessity, generate a series of assumptions. Such hypotheses include the view that the Soviet leadership found the Western containment strategy totally unacceptable. And that, as a consequence, Soviet policy was expanded to include additional objectives. Among these, was the destruction or circumvention of the political, military and economic alliances which constituted the Allied iron curtain[30] on the periphery of the then largely homogeneous Communist bloc. The Allied barrier had precluded the extension of a Soviet military presence and inhibited Communist bloc economic and political influence in the areas outside the containing walls.

18. In order to test these assumptions it was necessary to examine the rationale for containment, the methodology of encirclement and the Soviet Union's reaction to both. In addition, it was considered necessary to examine conditions in the areas of penetration to determine the independent variables, which contributed to an Allied presence and, subsequently, to Soviet encroachment and an established presence. Initially the task did not seem formidable as there appeared to be no shortage of both primary and secondary source material.

19. Examination of available literature, the interpretations influenced by perception and in effects thereof, are reported hereunder.

Research: The Initial Phase

20. David Dallin used two extremely well known quotations and inadvertently illustrated one of the points found characteristic of some highly respected authors - namely, the use of statements out of context. Dallin quoted Winston Churchill's "Russian policy is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma", both to counter Stalin's statement that "Our policy is simple and clear"[31] and to provide emphasis to the alleged Western difficulty in determining Soviet foreign policy.

21. Who, of Dallin's readers, would question Churchill's "honest" words when measured against Stalin's? Few did and great damage was done. During the year of research many experts, scholars and laymen were questioned. Nearly all of whom were familiar with the quoted portion of the Prime Minister's statement. Only two, of more than one hundred interviewed, were aware that Churchill had continued with "But perhaps there is a key. That key (to Soviet policy) is Russian national interest".[32] With the continuation of the quote the dramatic difference which had so effectively impressed the readers with the perceived difficulties would have been largely deflated. For in their own way, both Churchill and Stalin had said the same thing.

22. Some authors have tended to create a different illusion. "We have a greater knowledge of Soviet political machinations than those of the British Cabinet"[33] was expressed in relation to British secrecy during the Suez crisis. Both President Eisenhower and Foster Dulles echoed this view.

23. The examples cited appear to fall within the basic categories Robert Jervis had identified as a characteristic common to many analysts. "A strong policy bias pervades most of the analysts",[34] "once a person has developed an image of the other, especially a hostile image, ambiguous even discrepant information will be assimulated to that image"[35] and "a false definition of the situation ... makes the originally false conception come true".[36] For those who believe in the validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy, Jervis's observations provide an excellent warning of what to avoid to achieve objective analytical results.

24. There is, perhaps, no better example of inconsistency than that demonstrated by the highly knowledgeable Walter Z. Laqueur. In 1957, he spoke out strongly that a statement issued by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and published for all to see in Izvestiya on 17 April 1955 had in fact been ignored. Western governments, authors and academics overlooked that statement even though it provided a clear indication of a major change in Soviet policy in relation to the Middle East.[37] In spite of Laqueur's recognition of the validity of such and related Soviet source material, he inexplicably continued to complain bitterly concerning the "lack" of Soviet source data[38]; even though, as evidence which will be introduced later will establish, no shortage in fact existed. This error was belatedly recognized by Laqueur in 1969. He, then, complained that "as far as source material is concerned, the danger now is not of drought, but of drowning".[39]

25. It would be difficult to understand Laqueur's failure to follow up his initial 1957 observation, if it were not for his 1969 report that "the Middle East has no important natural resources other than its oil, but there is no lack of oil elsewhere in the world".[40] Strangely, Arnold L. Horelick, in a 1973 Rand study concerning foreign policy of the Soviet

Union, complained about the "lack" of Soviet source material, but immediately thereafter, in fact in the same text, expressed concern about the "abundance (of Soviet data) which had not been systematically examined".[41] It is possible that both Laqueur and Horelick lacked the time to research primary source data. However, it is odd that neither made any noted reference to the Milestones of Soviet Foreign Policy which contains some seventy-three major Soviet foreign policy resolutions, official communiques and decisions[42] or any mention of McNeal's most useful guide to the decisions of the Communist party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) covering the period 1917-1967.[43]

26. Although Laqueur, since 1969, has made considerable use of Soviet source material,[44] there is a common Western perception that such data are largely propaganda. Foy D. Kohler, former United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union, is a notable exception. He wrote that very few major Soviet decisions and actions "were not foreshadowed by authoritive (Soviet) statements ... and were not the subject of a major informational campaign".[45] He continued with "the main problem is not that the Soviets do not tell ... but that we are reluctant to believe they mean what they say".[46]

27. Walter Clemens Jr. made reference to a common but questionable approach used by "Kremlinologists", who use "games such as the carnival version of the shell and pea ... now you see it, now you don't ..." as a technique to determine "in whose hands are the grains of power"[47] and what policies leaders so determined, might be expected to foster. Clemens, himself, rejected this procedure by quoting Colton's lines concerning gamesters who "renounce earth, to forfeit heaven".[48] Henry Mayer, in his preface to the Rigby and Churchward book. contributed to confusion by pointing out that the two experts disagreed on both theoretical and practical aspects pertaining to the Soviet Union. He added weight to those who believe that "apart from the lack of

information there is something mysterious about Russian politics".[49] Churchward, in his portion of the publication, used extensively at Australian universities, pointed out that even in Fainsod's celebrated works "one finds next to nothing"[50] regarding Soviet decision-making.

28. The confusion is compounded by the many authors who pose questions, but offer few if any answers. Walter Clemens Jr., for example, asks "to what extent is Soviet policy an extension of the Tsarist quest for security, economic gains and prestige or a basically different course determined by Communist ideology, by dynamics of technological and societal modernization, or both?"[51] He left the issue unresolved. McLaurin added yet another factor as a possible motivating force to Soviet policy, when he asked whether the resolution "of conflict among competing elements"[52] in the USSR had an effect on decisions made. He also abstained from opinion.

29. The lack of certainty is not confined to Western authors; the Soviets, themselves, have contradictory views on the effect of national interest and tradition on Soviet foreign policy. Gauptman argued that "national interests are not static, nor are the geographic, demographic, political, economic or cultural factors because all were subject to interpretation and evaluation by the type of government in power and by class interests".[53] His views are countered by Semin who stresses that "history produces a tangible heritage of national material and spiritual wealth to the degree that even a change in ruling class cannot obliterate the ... values and traditions and that, in consequence, there is a continuity of national aims and objectives".[54] Kravtsev supports the latter's view for "the Russians who made the October revolution have not ceased being Russians" for they "are the product of their nation".[55]

30. Westerners, who do not read Russian have found such conflicting Soviet views difficult to accept. And even many who do know the language and study the primary source data, reject the credibility of the authors' views on the basis of their perception that there is unanimity in Soviet thought and that ideology has superceded nationalism.

31. Walter Z. Laqueur[56], Edward Luttwak[57], David Vital[58] and Richard Pipes[59] are among those who, with varying degrees of emphasis, equate traditional Tsarist Russian policies to those of the Soviet Union. Peter Meyer, however, differs, claiming that the driving force in Soviet policy is neither tradition nor ideology, but is the vested interest "of the Soviet bureaucratic regime".[60]

32. There is a "holier than thou" complex in much of the current Western writings regarding both the Soviet Union and the Middle East. The tendency is to equate what we do to "good" and, what they do, to "bad".[61] This is a common and unfortunate characteristic. Kurt London, for example, was so worried that the general public had forgotten about the evils of Communism that he wrote, "The degree of Western euphoria over the apparent détente ... only serves to highlight the need for a broad survey of what Soviet foreign policy has wrought".[62] London's earlier interpretation of Soviet intentions to "isolate the United States from Europe, to split the Western Allies in NATO, to destroy the EEC and to eventually draw East and West Europe together in a hegemonic security sphere without United States influence and presence",[63] however, drew a sharp retort from Franklyn Griffiths. Griffiths condemned London's views as "one-sided, simplistic and implicit rationalization for policies of continued East-West confrontation".[64]

33. Foy D. Kohler in conjunction with Harvey, Goure and Soll concluded that détente was interpreted by the Soviet Union as a licence from the United States to support "just" wars; the United States was "expected to cease all attempts to defend its interests or protect its allies".[65] Geoffrey Jukes countered this conclusion by arguing that "Any attempt to prove that the Soviet Union is more prone than Western nations to employ the use of the threat of force as a foreign policy instrument must fail when the behaviour of Western countries is taken into account".[66] Juke's remarks were strengthened by Allen Dulles who wrote about the methodology employed by the United States in overthrowing elected governments which had become "unjust" by revealing Communist tendencies, once in office.[67]

A Question of Perception

34. In addition to the quotations and extracts already used, the following are examples of the contradictory, over-lapping and at times identical views pertaining to events outlined in the historical sequence. The extracts have been placed under sub-headings covering containment, Soviet leadership, "good or evil", and ideology in relation to the Soviet Union. Views pertaining to the Middle East and North Africa follow.

Containment - Provocation or Necessity?

35. Anthony Bouscaren set the stage for post-World War II East-West confrontation with "After the threat to Stalingrad was ended and more clearly after the Teheran Conference of 1943 ... (Soviet) military, diplomatic, political and economic programmes became integrated into a long range anti-Western and no longer anti-German orientation ... the real enemy was the West".[68] Yaacov Ro'i expressed the Western reaction, "By late 1945, the United Kingdom and the United States were so concerned over

possible Soviet intentions ... they started forming military blocs and alliances to stop Russian encroachment".[69]

36. V.M. Molotov provided the Soviet view, "Great Britain's monopolistic position in the Mediterranean is a problem that we must resolve".[70] But, Sir Anthony Eden argued the rationale for augmentation of a situation which Molotov had already found unacceptable. He urged the Commonwealth Prime Ministers to make every effort "to participate in regional defence and to establish bases around the world to counter possible Soviet incursions. NATO, the Asian Alliance and the Allied groupings in the Middle East are part of the shield, which must be expanded".[71] Nikolai Bulganin again spoke out against these efforts, "The British, French and the United States policies of encirclement are both provocative and agressive, we will take the necessary action to counter such activities".[72] And, Peter Meyer dismissed the Western policies with, "Containment cannot succeed, only the disintegration of the (Soviet) machine will stop its advance".[73]

Soviet Leadership - Good, Bad or Indifferent?

37. During the time frame of the historical period covered in this study, there have been only three primary Soviet leaders - Malenkov, Khrushchev and Brezhnev. However, the impact of Lenin and Stalin on all that has happened in the Soviet Union since the revolution has been such that no study can exclude repeated reference to their influence. And, as many authors see Soviet policies as a continuation of those initiated by the Tsars, there is both direct and indirect mention of the traditional contribution. The following constitute representative appraisals gathered during the initial phase of research for this project.

38. Edward Crankshaw ridiculed Khrushchev and his staff when he wrote, "... one of the most serious mistakes of the West ... has been to overrate, often to an absurd degree, the knowledge and understanding of the world enjoyed by the Soviet leadership ...".[74] Roman Kolkowicz had a conflicting view, "The Soviet leadership is careful, orderly, prudent (and insists) on a careful assessment of costs versus gains ...".[75] Henry Kissinger introduced an elaborating perspective, "Anyone succeeding in Communist leadership struggles must be single-minded, unemotional, dedicated and above all motivated by an enormous desire for power".[76]

39. Eugene Rostow was both brief and direct in his assessment, "Soviet policy ... is conducted by serious and determined men".[77] Herbert Dinerstein added another dimension, "The Western perception of a monolithic dictator controlling all in the Soviet Union is a major deficiency in Western analysis as it precludes the understanding of internal politics in the Soviet system and thereby contributes to erroneous Western analysis".[78]

40. Richard Pipes took a superior approach and cautioned that "it does not pay to be too clever with Russian politicians, they are inclined to interpret ambiguity as equivocation, equivocation as weakness and weakness as a signal to act".[79] But, Kissinger suggested a greater depth and understanding when he wrote that Russian leadership "has shown that it is prepared to accept humiliation, loss of prestige and of vested interests to avoid nuclear war".[80]

41. Dean Acheson was caustic, "The Soviet leaders have followed the imperialist tradition of expansion and enslavement".[81] Richard Lowenthal was much more kind, "The Soviet leaders were in a position to inflict incalculable damage on England ... they deliberately preferred to offer a compromise".[82] Richard Pipes, however, downgraded Soviet capability to inflict the damage

suggested by Lowenthal, by arguing that "Khrushchev instigated a major deception intended to convince ... that he had at his disposal more nuclear weapons and better ways of delivering them than in fact was the case".[83] This view was supported by John Campbell, who wrote that Khrushchev "thought or he thought that we thought that the USSR was gaining superiority in strategic weapons".[84]

Good or Evil - A Question of Opinion?

42. The question of what is good and what is evil has been a basic problem in all civilizations. The allocation of any act to either category stems primarily from the perception of those who hold power in each specific society, be it a democracy or a totalitarian state. Whether the Stern Gang or the PLO are terrorists or freedom fighters depends on the vested interests of the assessing individual. Such interpretations tend to provide justification for the use of any means to achieve a desired end. The following are representative perceptions pertaining to the Soviet Union.

43. Alvin Z. Rubenstein wrote that "The Soviets are disliked and mistrusted everywhere in the world ... they gain their objectives through manipulation and exploitation ...".[85] His view was supported by Kurt London who submitted that their system "is irreconcilably hostile to ours", it is "more imperialistic than the old-fashioned empires ...".[86]

44. Edward Taborsky warned that Soviet constraint in the Third World was likely to end. In his view, the Russians having failed to achieve their objectives by non-violent methods would revert to violence.[87] Vernon Aspaturian questioned Russian integrity pertaining to détente. He warned that the

Soviet Union was not to be trusted. It is his contention that Soviet leadership makes overtures which are attractive to the West, such as disarmament, but has no intention to comply with any agreement reached.[88]

45. G.A. Arbatov countered these views and commented that the works of Western authors and politicians reflected a "constant policy of anti-socialism", "abject duplicity in relation to the USSR" and "hatred toward those who struggle against imperialism".[89] G. Andreev attempted to clarify the situation further. He wrote that "Soviet policy, as approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU", makes it "clear to all that there must never be a nuclear war". This decision "does not mean that the struggle between the capitalist and socialist systems is over"; "it will continue until socialism is triumphant".[90] His point was amplified by V. Israely'an, "peaceful coexistence with other governments both socialist and capitalist does not mean the absence of Soviet opposition to capitalist aggression or lack of (Soviet) support for those who seek liberation from imperialism".[91]

46. M. MccGwire, Ken Booth and John McDonnell recognized the validity of such Soviet statements and made the point that Soviet support for détente was one thing, but it's actions in the Third World were another. They wrote that "Soviet policy is likely to be consistent in its efforts to lower tension; however, local activism will continue".[92] Ray Cline, in reviewing Soviet activity, considered that, "In contrast with Soviet consistency, the United States, in the past five years, has exhibited a confusion about national purposes".[93] And, V. Israely'an went further, "Our policy equates to peace and socialist harmony; Western policy contributes to tension, results in the creation of aggressive alliances and hovers on the brink of war".[94]

47. Lawrence Whetten considered that Moscow had devised a logically sound basis for adopting a highly flexible policy, which is being, "... erroneously described by Western critics as ambiguous and opportunistic".[95] Richard Lowenthal expanded this view by pointing out that the Soviet belief that "the forces of history are on Russia's side "means that action to expediate the inevitable conclusion of a socialistic victory will only be taken by Soviet leadership where and when there is minimal risk.[96] Victor Zorza also exhibited optimism concerning Soviet policy for "there is evidence of political maturity and an understanding that some gains are not worth the risk of direct confrontation".[97]

48. The Soviet Institute of Philosophy repeated that "The Marxist-Leninists associate peaceful coexistence with the extension of the inevitable development of the world revolutionary process".[98] But, Edward Crankshaw again stressed that there was no Soviet planning, "We have often attributed great subtlety and exactitude of calculation to the manifestation of Soviet government behaviour which often arises from ignorance and muddle".[99] Edward Taborsky added injustice to alleged Soviet stupidity. He found all Soviet objectives to be evil, and all Western objectives to be good. Soviet aid was provided for unjust reasons; whereas, United States aid was made available for noble purposes.[100]

49. B.G. Gafurev was among those who expounded the other side of the argument. He claimed all efforts by the United States to counter Soviet policies were evil and designed to perpetuate hate, tension and the possibility of war.[101] A.A. Grechko attacked US policy and particularly the Nixon Doctrine which he considered "preordained failure".[102] The Soviet Institute for Economics, Politics and Ideology, in assessing US policy, concluded "Although American strategists realize that direct military action ... is not a rational

course ... they nevertheless take such risks ... this form of unpredictability is dangerous".[103] I. Zhilin, meanwhile, warned that "... all the talk about an end to the era of wars and the arrival of an era of peace is both premature and dangerous".[104] And, Arbatov once again repeated the rationale for Soviet policy, "The rationality of the Soviet approach (is manifested by the Soviet realization) that the alternative to nuclear war is coexistence ... but under such conditions there continues the full competition between the two systems in economic, social, cultural and material matters. Material production is a dominant factor in social life ... and is, therefore, a decisive factor in Soviet victory".[105]

50. R. Conquest saw fit to remind his readers that the Soviet government is based on "Mongolian despotism", and that "Western culture is civilization; theirs is a backward system ...".[106] Ambassador Kohler had earlier written that the Soviet system "could be described as simply a more ruthless and efficient version of the authoritarian rule of the Czars".[107] Kohler had raised the Mongolian connection in another light. In his opinion, Soviet behaviour suffered from its isolation from Western heritage and that Russian policy in relation to China stemmed from "ingrained prejudice which goes back to the Mongol-Tartar invasion".[108]

51. A. Solzhenitsyn made his distaste of the Soviet system clear in comparing "Soviet wolves (are) worse than Nazi dogs ...".[109] Yaacov Ro'i charged that the Soviet government made "use of détente ... and the Geneva spirit to penetrate a third region",[110] making it sound as though he had achieved a breakthrough in analysis. But, Juviler and Morton concluded that "Our case studies support that the conclusion and the totalitarian model, of an all-powerful system with self-perpetuating control, no longer serves to explain the Soviet reality".[111]

Ideology - A Live or a Dead Issue?

52. Defined by the Soviet Encyclopaedia as a system of definite views, concepts, ideas and motivation adhered to be some class or party, ideology as it related to the Soviet Union is the subject of great controversy. The role ideology plays, or is deemed to play in Soviet policy, is covered by the following representative extracts.

53. Raymond Garthoff in his introduction to Marshall Sokolovsky's Military Strategy wrote "The reader will find some passages laden with almost incredible ideological distortions and he is, of course, advised to disregard them, but not without realizing that the Soviet reader considers them meaningful".[112] W.A. Williams appeared to counter the impression of a Soviet monopoly of ideological distortion concerning "ideological preparation". He quoted Danial P. Moynihan in relation to Vietnam, "few (of the US administration) ... did not contribute (to the efforts) to persuade the American people that we were entirely right". "... our own guilt and actions provide the excuse and justification for Soviet actions and distortions.[113] Leonard Schapiro saw fit to warn that Soviet tactical retreats "have led some people to believe that communism is no longer a relevant factor ... it is suggested that these implied or explicit denials of an ultimate purpose in Soviet policy are fallacious".[114] Morton Schwartz, however, considered that the Soviet leaders now ascribe more importance to traditional diplomatic matters than to the ideologically rooted notions of the "fraternal alliance of progressive and revolutionary forces".[115]

54. Henry Kissinger may have been releasing pent-up frustrations when he wrote, "To the (Soviet) prophet, negotiations have only symbolic value ... a means of converting or demoralizing an opponent: truth by definition cannot be compromised".[116] To the Soviets, their ideology is the truth. But, Leonid Brezhnev, in speaking about foreign policy, indicated that negotiation was the only course of action, "Détente ... is essential to create conditions for the relaxation of tension and the resolution of problems by negotiation".[117] V. Israely'an had made Brezhnev's point in 1967. "Ideological and political disputes should not be settled by war ... for even communism cannot be implanted by means of war".[118]

55. Herbert Dinerstein reminded all, that "Communist ideological statements play both a ritual and internal political role ... failure to accord each its proper place creates false estimates" of Soviet policy.[119] And, Adam Ulam expanded on this by writing that "Ideology plays a crucial part" in the philosophy of Soviet power and, therefore, with the ways and means of achieving Soviet objectives.[120] Robert Daniels characterized ideology as "a propaganda aspect of Soviet foreign policy ... an excuse or justification".[121] Whereas, Grant Pendill Jr. quoted R. Lowenthal to the effect "that the operative parts of ideology are those which keep the Communist Party in power".[122] And, to illustrate a different concept, Pendill also quoted R.H. Carew-Hunt to the effect that, "... ideology influences the readers' perceptions and thereby influences policy and decisions ...".[123]

56. Juviler and Morton wrote that "where ideology has clashed with more immediate, practical political considerations, ideology has given way".[124] This appeared to offset Laqueur's contention that "All attempts to account for Soviet foreign policy without due regard to the ideological factor are ultimately sterile, their only effect is to make a complicated phenomenon even more incomprehensible".[125] Barrington Moore Jr. took the middle ground "... although Soviet foreign policy is distinguished by this Marxist ingredient, it is not necessarily true that the Marxist component is the most important one".[126]

57. John C. Campbell expanded on the place of ideology, "Contemporary Soviet policy ... finds no exclusive explanation in geography, tradition or in ideology ... it is a reflection of the Soviet Union's determination to be not a continental but a global power on a par with the United States ... Yet this is not a policy of aggression, risk and crisis (it is one) of consolidation".[127] Joshua and Gilbert differed concerning the role of ideology as a motivating factor, "... revision of the non-Marxist international system has been the guiding principle of the Soviet leaders in conducting their foreign policy".[128] But, Robert Hunter reflects uncertainty, "... it is even harder to decide whether Soviet policy is still in part ideological or if it is based solely on an ambition to become a world power on the American scale".[129]

The Middle East and North Africa - Conflicting Truths

58. After overcoming Western containment efforts in the Mediterranean region, the Soviet Union established a presence in the Middle East and North Africa. The major actors involved in this development were those indigenous to the area, the residual and former colonial powers, and the

United States and the Soviet Union. Minor players included the rest of the world either directly or through the United Nations.

59. Most of the literature concerning events related to North Africa and the Middle East is presented in a perceived cause and effect syndrome. In consequence, much published material complicates objective research. The multiplicity of local and foreign vested interests combined with racial, ideological, economic and military preconceptions blur, if not completely distort, the evidence. Moreover, for the bulk of Western authors, North American, West European and Israeli literature constitute the major source of information. Only a small percentage of the vast amount of Soviet material is translated. Relatively little Arab, Turkish, Iranian and other national related literature is published in English. Even for those qualified to use material in non-Western language form, the prejudices, inherent in interpretation of most information concerning the controversial topic of the Middle East, tend to preclude clinical methodology in analysis. To illustrate the dilemma, the following extracts and quotations were selected to provide representative examples of the conflicting points of view relative to the Middle East; an area which for centuries has been subjected to colonial policies, continuous tensions, local and inter-major power hostilities, terrorism and, in recent years, potential confrontation between the superpowers.

Western Coverage - A Question of Conscience?

60. The use of prejudicial interpretation has characterized wartime publications of all nations. The stereotyping of alleged racial characteristics, both flattering and derogatory, plays a significant role in justifying government policies. While all are probably aware of this pattern of human behaviour, at times self-delusion clouds the issues and constant repetition so permeates the mind that objectivity is lost.

61. As the Middle East fits into the wartime category, each nation and its nationals, whether directly or indirectly involved, tend to employ propaganda tactics. The Middle East situation, moreover, is affected by additional factors which influence perception. Malcolm Kerr's words are, therefore, of great significance. He wrote, "Our perceptions of the world are distorted, not only by the incompleteness of our information, but also by the way in which our established habits of thought and taste and inherited forms of moral preference tend to mould our consciousness of events into familiar patterns. American perceptions of the Arab-Israeli conflict present a prime example ... it tends to be cut out of a comfortably familiar pattern of attitudes and sympathies ingrained in the American experience ... Israel is seen as a Western state, populated by technologically-minded, energetic, democratic, pioneering frontiermen, who are transforming a wilderness and providing a home for the persecuted ... the Arabs are seen as exasperating, inscrutable, unreliable, inept, backward, authoritarian and emotional".[130] Kerr continued with another most important factor, "American liberals cannot find fault with a collective Jewish cause because of the implications of anti-Semitism".[131] "In consequence, in the Middle East conflict, the critical facilities of otherwise sensitive Americans have been anaesthetized. Support for Israel in an automatic liberal cause and Israeli actions that would draw strong condemnation if

undertaken by another country are defended by liberals with the same arguments that apologists for colonialism and racial inequality have invoked elsewhere".[132]

62. George Ball, in the initial stage of his article recommending a stronger United States policy in relation to Israel, used the same arguments as Kerr in explaining American attitudes, "Most Americans approach the problem of the Middle East with a pro-Israeli bias and rightly so".[133] He continued with, "... to take a strong stand, a more assertive line is to risk being attacked as a servant either of Arab interests or of oil companies or of being denounced as anti-Israeli (or) by a careless confusion of language even condemned as anti-Semitic".[134]

Fact or Interpretation?

63. Rabbi Israel Miller, Chairman of The Presidents of Major American-Jewish Organizations, in testimony before a US Congressional Committee, argued that it was in the interests of the United States to support Israel because of its strategic location, because of American need for a dependable in-area ally, because Israel was a democratic state (the only one in the Middle East) and because of the need to stop the USSR from establishing pre-eminence in the area.[135] Nadav Safran, in front of the same Committee, rejected the United States-Israeli security arrangements as being directed primarily at the Arabs.[136] And, M. Vilner, the Secretary General of the Israeli Communist Party, concluded that United States policy in the Middle East was an effort to use Israel to reestablish imperialist colonial rule over Arab territories.[137]

64. H.H. King Hussein of Jordan stated, "The Arab is convinced that the United States is prepared to underwrite whatever territorial plans Israel may insist on to live in security.

If this is not so the Arabs need to know it. So does Israel".[138] W. Griffith, as concerned as King Hussein, called for the United States to "reject the folly of domestic ethnic politics given priority over the American national interests".[139] In a subsequent article, Griffith suggested that the United States bring economic pressures on the Israelis to comply with American guidance.[140] George Ball, former Under Secretary of State, also presented the problems of any US administration acting effectively and responsibly because of the Jewish lobby. He, however, saw great dangers unless President Carter overcame pro-Israeli Senate opposition and took positive action to preclude further local conflict and the dangers of escalation.[141] And, John Donovan provided an Arab perspective to the Middle East issue by quoting Arab League President Abduhl Azzan Pasha, who on 22 April 1950, years before the Soviet arms agreement, stated "The Arab countries are ready to extend their hand to Russia because the United States was pro-Jewish".[142]

65. Freda Utley submitted in 1957 that the West, by rejecting the legitimate aspirations of the Arab states, forced them to turn to the USSR. She drew a comparison with the refusal of the Western powers and Japan to give up their "imperialist privileges in China", a situation which forced Sun Yat Sen to turn to Russia.[143] A.S. Protapopov, in the official Soviet review of the Suez crisis, also used the Utley economic argument. He suggested that when the United States rejected the Egyptian request for support of the Aswan Dam project, it did so in confidence that no other source of aid was available. And, that through the pressure of withholding assistance Foster Dulles could change events in the Middle East. The Americans had not reckoned on the Soviet Union being an alternate source of aid.[144]

66. Zbigniew Brzezinski, somewhat out of present character, carried the alternative source of aid further when, in reviewing the 1956 situation in the Third World, he wrote "At the present time there appears to be no viable institutions or alternative programs (in the West) to match the Communist Party organization with Soviet support ... once the disintegrative consequences of rapid industrialization began to make themselves felt in largely backward and traditional societies".[145] F.D. Holzman examined US-Soviet rivalries in Middle East aid and trade and drew the same conclusion that Brzezinski had reached thirteen years earlier. Holzman wrote that "the centrally controlled and planned economy of the USSR had distinct advantages".[146]

67. W. Joshua in a report, published by the National Strategy Information Center, wrote that "The Soviet leaders are on the verge of fulfilling the age old dreams of the Tsars to expand the Russian empire southward" and "that Soviet efforts revealed the persistence of Russian objectives".[147] L. Tolkunov, a Soviet academic, however, countered accusations of Soviet imperialism by writing that the USSR sought only full freedom for the Arabs and this objective was noble. The Western authors "distorted" Soviet actions and clouded their own by deception.[148]

68. Kurt London condemned the USSR for supplying arms to the Arabs, a "generally irrational and unreliable peoples" and thereby "endangering world peace".[149] General E.L.M. Burns had a different view; he considered that Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East was designed to establish the USSR "as their (Arab) friend and the protector of their (Arab) interests".[150] V.I. Aboltin, editor of the Soviet International Year Book, concurred with General Burns' conclusion, but added that the United States was a threat, arguing that "the Soviet Union acted

(solely) as a defender of the Arabs against both the United States and Israel".[151]

69. Khairy Issa and Ahmed Youseff, at an International symposium held in Cairo, however, accused the Soviet Union of imperialist designs in the Middle East, describing the policy as one with "a colonial tendency based on strategic and economic needs", needs which had "been evident since Peter the Great".[152] And, E.V. Rostow warned the Arabs of the dangers of collaboration with the USSR, pointing out the "risks to Egypt of a career as a Soviet tool as illustrated in the history of the 1956 and 1967 wars".[153] W. Joshua took a more pessimistic view of the Israeli situation and wrote that "... virtually all informed laymen see that Israel is now beleaguered by authoritarian Arab governments who fuel their anti-American propaganda with Russian subsidies ..."[154]

70. Abraham S. Becker and Arnold L. Horelick, in their 1970 Rand study, considered that "The USSR's high profile in the (Middle East) region is seen as the culmination of a series of largely ad hoc initiatives and responses undertaken by a succession of Soviet leaders in a highly fluid policy environment".[155] Walter Z. Laqueur chastized the West for slowness of reaction to Soviet indicators of policy and gave credence to Soviet planning and expertise. He wrote "while their (Israeli) Western colleagues debated hopes and fears and intentions of Colonel Nasser, the Soviet experts occupied themselves ... with the political, social and economic realities of the Middle East".[156]

71. Yet Laqueur previously had attributed the deteriorating situation in the Middle East to the "infantile vanity" of Nasser.[157] And in this, he had in part echoed Sir Anthony Eden who, when reviewing the factors which had culminated in the abortive Suez operation, had written that Nasser "will fall as

soon as our troops appear ... he is unpopular at home, obnoxious abroad ... he is vain and paranoic".[158] In assessing Sir Anthony's and his predecessors' Middle East policies, Grant McClellan, however, wrote that "British leadership has led from disaster to disaster", and condemned British support of "aged and reactionary (Arab) leaders".[159]

72. Aaron S. Klieman, concerned that perception was creating illusions, warned that "it is as superficial to equate the Arab-Israeli conflict with regional instability as it is a disservice to all peoples of the area who have pressing economic and social needs".[160]

Zionism - Soviet, Israeli, Arab and Other Viewpoints

73. D.A. Dragunskii, while explaining the changed Soviet attitude towards Israel, claimed that the Israeli government had sold out to the West and that "Zionism had become a significant element with the monopolistic structure of international imperialism".[161] S. Krylov, in a book published by the Soviet War Ministry, extended Dragunskii's view of Zionism being an enemy of the USSR. He described Zionist support for both Nazi Germany and for the United States as being directed against the security and continued existence of the Soviet Union.[162] K. Ivanov and Z. Sheinas elaborated on the Soviet perspective by tracing the changes in Israeli policies to the point where "Zionism and the capitalist, imperialist Western societies were in fact identical".[163]

74. An Israeli view, expounded by Baruch A. Hazan, of the change in Soviet attitudes towards Israel, claimed that "the activities of the Jewish Defence League and the worldwide campaign for the liberation of Soviet Jews suddenly transformed Zionism ... into one of the main enemies of the USSR ...".[164]

75. Abdul A. Said, in putting forward the Arab view, argued that the primary concern of the Arabs was not with Communism, democracy, capitalism or socialism, it was with Zionism.[165]

76. For the reasons outlined by both Malcolm Kerr and George Ball, (pertaining to attitudes towards Israel), Western reference to Zionism is limited.

Ideology - A Factor in Soviet Middle East Policy?

77. Arbatov of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, in discussing the world revolutionary process, downgraded the effectiveness of Third World Communist parties and described them as "existentialistic and lyrical ... lacking the true substance of Communism".[166] Robert O. Freedman, in his analysis of Communist parties in the Middle East and their relationship with the CPSU, also concluded that as far as Moscow was concerned such Communist parties were far more trouble than they were worth.[167] B.N. Ponomarev, now a member of the Politburo, had earlier written that indigenous Communist parties should refrain from any action which might alienate the incumbent national governments. For as long as national governments were anti-Western, it was in the overall Communist interest not to force issues.[168] Communist ideology was to be subordinated to ensure short term Soviet interests. Oded Eron, however, is representative of many Westerners in considering that, in the long term, the USSR intends to bring about the conversion of the Middle East states to Marxist-Leninist doctrines.[169]

78. Stephan Constant suggested that the supression of Communist parties in the Middle East "should not be equated to a Western victory over socialism ... but acknowledged as a manifestation of (the strength of) Arab nationalism and religion".[170] W.W. Kulski tended to be more pragmatic and argued that

Marxist-Leninist ideology played a minor role in Soviet policy regarding the Third World, "it makes no difference if a given regime is non-communist, anti-communist or a military dictatorship, so long as it is willing to maintain friendly relations with the USSR".[171] And, M. Kapista, in his 1967 explanation of Soviet policy vis à vis the developing world submitted that the indigenous Third World societies, in most cases, were not ready for revolution, they lacked a class structure and an organization capable of forming a credible government. In consequence, "only the local reactionaries and the Western imperialists, both of whom were losing out under national liberation progressive governments, would advocate revolt and revolution". To bring an unqualified government to power would be to ensure its fall and replacement by a traditionalist, pro-imperialist regime. Much better for those seeking social justice, was a government of national liberation regardless of political orientation so long as it opposed imperialism.[172]

The Middle East - An Arab Perspective of Perception

79. Ibraham Abu Lughod asked why, in the two years which had lapsed since the June 1967 war, "not a single scholarly, objective and detached investigation of the factors which had led to the confrontation" had appeared in the English language.[173] Edward Said, took a different position and queries why "must it always be ESSO or the Rand Corporation, or the School of Oriental and African Studies which so heavily impress our identity and our behaviour ...".[174]

80. The lack of Arab initiative in explaining its own case was commented on also by the London Times, in its review of Middle East Affairs. The Times concluded that "Their Zionist opponents seem to control all the lines to liberal world opinion."[175]

81. Lewis Awad exhibited considerable depth of understanding when he down-played the significance of Arab-Israeli dispute over territory. He wrote that "many of us have come to realize that our confrontation with Israel is not merely military, but is a confrontation between two forms of civilization".[176] Hisham Sharbi, in apparent agreement in a pessimistic mood concerning what such confrontation might bring, states "we are entering on a dark difficult period, within the short term, no light in sight".[177] Edward Said carried this thought further, "The Arab today is the victim of his own neglect, surely the legacy of centuries of colonial rule".[178]

82. Jacques Berque, a non-Arab, who had the unique experience of presenting the opening address of an all-Arab meeting, anticipated the Arab views when he made the point that the Middle East "is today a world of scientific and technological revolution" to which the Arabs "must gain access under pain of servitude or death". Berque also submitted that "the self-satisfied statements of Arab leaders hid the true inferiority felt by the Arab population".[179]

83. Edward Said accused the Western media of pro-Israeli bias which made the Arabs appear "ridiculous, over-sexed, degenerate, sadistic and low". He claimed that "Arabs are photographed as mobs of hysterical anonymous men whereas the Israelis are pictured as stalwart individuals, with the light of heroes shining from their eyes", and that the Westerners automatically assessed Arabs who opposed "the occupation of their lands (as) terrorists not resistence fighters".[180]

Peace in the Middle East - Welcome But?

84. George W. Ball, in an article entitled "How to Save Israel Inspite of Herself, wrote that "the relatively impotent governments in key Arab countries and in Israel will never by themselves be able to devise a compromise solution". He continued "there is by no means a unanimous desire for peace" on either side. Ball rejected a unilateral United States effort to bring about a peace, but argued that the United States should "insist that both sides" abide by UN Resolution 242 and that the principal powers supporting the resolution, including the Soviet Union, should guarantee the "inviolability of the boundaries as finally determined".[181]

85. George Ball also recognized that there were moderate Arab states whose leaders feared and wished "to avoid radicalization and an increase of Soviet influence".[182] It is interesting to note that in an article predating Ball's by some eight years, J. Gaspard had written "the traditional Arab states do not wish a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict as peace would divert the attention of the progressive Arabs to resolution of the inequities within the Arab states themselves, particularly in the traditional autocratic, rich states".[183]

86. Stanley Hoffman considered that "Israel should take the initiative and demand an overall peace settlement ... (there should be) no gradual concessions but a clear cut decision". As many of the major powers as possible should be implicated on the arrangements.[184] Saul Friedlander and Mahmaud Hussein chose an alternate path to peace. The UN resolutions should be implemented "by stages".[185] And, Yair Evron rejected both suggestions. He argued that the United Nations was discredited, that the major powers must not attempt to impose a solution or even interfere and that "the Middle East situation could only be and would only be resolved by Israel and the Arab states themselves".[186]

Interpretation - In Relation to the Soviet Union

87. Examination of the source material, researched up to this point of the study, gave cause to quote Orwell's observation that "Political language ... is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind".[187] And, to appreciate that many had apparently failed to heed Kulski's caution that "The Soviet view is more complicated than people who have never studied Soviet foreign policy might presume. Simplistic analysis could very well lead to wrong conclusions".[188] There is, in addition, the problem of perception as Vital so clearly expressed, "whether one chose to see Soviet Russia as an unweidly and unfortunate giant perpetually thrashing about in an effort to defend itself ... or instead as a monster bent ... on aggression ... is a matter of taste".[189] Together, the deceptive effects of propaganda, simplistic analysis and preconception have clouded and distorted the evidence and precluded objective analysis and synthesis.

88. William A. Glaser provided an academic approach in his attempt to resolve the problems inherent in the nature and thrust of Soviet foreign policy. However the spectrum of conflicting opinion, among the personnel he gathered, was such that nothing was resolved or clarified.[190] Alexander Dallin's selection of readings also provided an academic approach to the problem; but in isolation from reality, only controversy resulted.[191]

89. The panel of experts, which gathered in Washington to review new trends in Soviet policy, examined the same evidence, yet split between the European and US contingents in the interpretation of the material. The European experts considered that the evidence indicated that the USSR would seek an accommodation with the United States under conditions of nuclear parity; the US group concluded that there would be a direct Soviet challenge

to the United States for global supremacy.[192] Neither group were prepared to admit erroneous analysis.

90. The effect of perception on analysis is often acknowledged but seldom corrected. It is always the person who has the other point of view that is in error. Dinerstein's observation that "Soviet perception of the outside world is based on its preconception of the United States".[193] would appear, at first glance, to be supported by Zhdanov's 1947 conclusion that "The United States is the primary driving force of the imperialist camp ... the lines are drawn" between us.[194] However, research did not go far enough to determine whether "our concept of their concept concerning us" was factual or just another case of mirror-image.

91. George Kennan's 1947 prediction that "the frustration of Russia's expansionist tendencies would lead either to a break-up or a gradual mellowing of Soviet power"[195] was not corrected by this acknowledged authority on Soviet affairs for ten years. During the 1957 Kieth Lectures, Kennan explained that he had under-estimated Soviet economic capabilites which had surpassed anything he had thought possible in his earlier prognosis. Yet even in 1969, Zbigniew Brzezinski supported the view that the Soviet Union would collapse during the 1970's[196] and himself questioned Soviet "staying power".[197]

92. Both Kennan and Brzezinski are men of outstanding ability and, in both examples, data on which to base more accurate estimates should have been available. Either such information was not used or it was interpreted incorrectly. Kohler's "we are reluctant to believe ..."[198] may well have been applicable.

Interpretation - In Relation to the Middle East

93. The views expressed in the section dealing with the Middle East reflect most clearly the depth of emotion and irrationality linked with the subject. Assistant Secretary of State Atherton, perhaps unconsciously, provided an excellent example of a narrow view, during his testimony to the House Committee. When justifying the proposed US release of Hawk and Vulcan air defence systems to Jordan, he argued that they were purely defensive weapons. But, when questioned, he admitted that if Jordan had had the systems in 1973, it could have mustered its forces in safety from Israeli air attack and joined in the Egyptian-Syrian offensive![199]

94. Panels of experts in the Middle East field, have had no greater success in the agreed evaluation of data than have had the Sovietologists. The Special Study Group, organized by the Institute for the Study of Conflict (ISC), came up with three separate conclusions. The West European perspective was influenced by concern regarding trading routes and the sources of essential oil. The United States' perception was influenced by defence commitments to Israel and by national policy directed at ensuring that the USSR did not achieve preeminence in the area. Both groups agreed, however, that the Soviet Union sought to remove Western military, economic and political influence from the Middle East.[200]

95. As one would expect, no two appraisals are further apart than the Arab and Israeli. This point was well illustrated in the review of Heikal's Road to Ramadan[201] in "Soviet Jewish Affairs".[202] There was no common ground only a point by point negation of the Egyptian views.

99. It was considered essential to evaluate the material reviewed before continuing the project. It had become increasingly apparent that an error of judgement had been made in the introductory remarks where it had been stated that there appeared to be no shortage of either primary or secondary source material. Closer examination, however, revealed vast gaps in coverage, inconsistency, the use of data out of context, biased selectivity and inexcusable procedures.

100. With the exception of the works of a relatively small number of true scholars, the basic weaknesses inherent in the majority of publications studied appeared to stem from authors' efforts to select and use "evidence" which would substantiate preconceived opinions. There was in addition evidence of collusion. Cliques of authors appeared to establish credibility for their own views by quoting each other to the extent that extremely questionable primary source information became factual through repetition. Such incestuous behaviour was confirmed only by tracing quoted secondary sources to the original mention of primary data.

101. It was particularly difficult to accept such conclusions. Many of the authors had established themselves as experts in the fields of Soviet, East European and Middle East affairs. Most had influenced the perceptions of students, academics, bureaucrats and politicians. Some had testified before government committees and had contributed to the formulation of foreign policy.

102. Nevertheless, with notable exceptions, the credibility of what had been published was very much in doubt. The attempted Western containment of the Communist bloc (currently being revived as post-Afghanistan policy) was never examined thoroughly. Whether it was necessary or whether it was unwarranted provocation which contributed to the prolonged

Cold War remains a matter of opinion. The absence of objectivity in analysis precluded any possible resolution of Soviet intent. The repeated references to traditional Russian imperialist and to Soviet ideological motivations for territorial expansion, the application of the mystery veil to limit clinical analysis of available evidence, the undisciplined references to "well - they are like that" all serve to compound confusion.

103. Most matters relating to Soviet leadership were clearly assessed on preconception. It was only among those Western leaders and authors who had actually established working relationships with the Soviet hierarchy that there was an objective approach and paradoxically a more flattering assessment. There was very little effort made, however, to establish the capability of the Soviet leadership to achieve USSR national objectives. And, on the occasions when such efforts were made, the assessments lacked balance because of the emphasis given to Western-perceived Soviet political, economic and military threats.

104. The repeatedly raised questions of what was "good" and what was "evil" were not measured against any agreed standard. When certain Western authors tried to apply rationality to such judgements, their efforts became suspect because of overtones of national self-incrimination. The rejections of Communist ideology were often blurred by the preconception of authors who automatically denied a social merit in any of the Marxist-Leninist doctrines. Even among the comparatively small number of Western authors who had studied the subject in detail, there was an obvious tendency to subordinate their accrued knowledge in order to stay within the parameters of their national political and readership prejudices.

105. To those who have been directly exposed to the forced application of ideologies, including ethnic, racial, religious, social and political, bias and irrationality, it has been a very real and often lethal experience. But for those, spared such personal contact, the effects of continued exposure to prejudiced interpretation of historical and current developments are no less disasterous. The perpetuation of fear and hatred thrives on the lack of understanding.

106. Insofar as the Middle East is concerned, even if the Soviet Union was not at all involved, there is intolerable bias applied to the questionable analysis of almost every issue.

107. In summary, the state of the art, as reflected primarily in secondary source material, suggests most strongly that objectivity and, therefore, honesty are sadly lacking. There is no way to become an instant expert. Nor should the biased views of "qualified" authors be equated to the truth. Further research and emphasis on primary source material are essential before any rational appreciation of Soviet foreign policy and its application to North Africa and the Middle East can be formulated.

108. It was found essential, if the project was to be continued, to devise a methodology to overcome the pitfalls and inadequacies discovered. Means taken to evolve such a system and the results are covered in the successive publications in this series.

FOOTNOTES

1. D.J. Dallin, Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy 1939-42, (pp. 168/174). An earlier phase of poor relations between the West and the USSR is covered by Dallin in his description of British and French preparations to initiate military operations against the Soviet Union from bases in the Middle East during the Russo-Finnish conflict in 1940.

2. B. Collier, The Lion and the Eagle. Collier presented the case that allied pre-World War II bases were earmarked both to contain Germany and to prevent the USSR from taking any action which could have endangered the British areas of influence and control.

3. A. Eden, London Times, 8 March 1955. The British Foreign Minister pleaded that additional military alliances and regional defence groupings were essential "to constrain the Communist Bloc ...".

4. Y.V. Gankovsky, Seminar at Carleton University, Ottawa, 7-9 December 1977. The Acting Director of the Soviet Institute of Oriental Studies, South Asia Division, USSR Academy of Sciences made the point that the American use of nuclear weapons against a defeated Japan had two basic objectives. The first was to end hostilities "before the Soviet forces liberated Japan and brought it into the socialist camp"; the second was "to display against human targets the catastrophic potential of nuclear weaponry and thus deter the Soviet leadership from pressing its claims in the post-war period".

5. D.J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin. The priority may well have stemmed from the denial of alternate options. Dallin, for example, provides a most useful historical record of Stalin's efforts to obtain control of Italian territories in North Africa, efforts which were originally approved by US Secretary of State Stettinius, but subsequently rejected by the British and US governments; and, of Stalin's attempt (rejected by President Truman) to annex the Turkish portion of Armenia.

6. Y.V. Gankovsky, Seminar at Carleton University, Ottawa, 7-9 December 1977. Gankovsky stressed that the 22 million Soviet citizens killed during hostilities, the vast destruction or urban areas and internal unrest resulted in the Soviet leadership giving first priority to domestic policy and internal security. The borders of the USSR, however, had to be secured to permit such action.

7. J.W. Burton, Non-alignment. Pressures to join Western alliances were very strong; non-alignment was considered "a short lived expediency" ... "stability needed to safeguard against alignment pressures in the (West-East) power conflict", (p. 11). Or, as Dulles put it, "You are either with us or against us - there is no other choice".

8. E.B. Atkeson, Strategic Review, Vol. 4, no. 2. The rationale for the extensive western defence efforts in the Middle East and North Africa may well have stemmed from the necessity to counter "geopolitical imperatives" to establish an in-area presence attributed by the author to the USSR.

9. M. Ardalan, Iran's Domestic and Foreign Policy. The actual military value of the Baghdad Pact and of CENTO has always been suspect. The Shah described the latter as a "club where people meet and talk and disband without achieving much", (p. 160). However, the actual commitment of the major Western military powers to these alliances made it clear to the USSR that any significant clash involving Soviet and Treaty troops could escalate into major hostilities.

10. P. Calvocoressi, Suez - Ten Years After. French efforts to retain Algeria and to suppress the FLN, which was provided arms by Egypt, are linked by the author to the participation by France in the coordinated effort to overthrow President Nasser at the time of the Suez crisis. The French objective was to remove the "progressive" supporter of national liberation movements and to cut the supply of Soviet weaponry.

11. G. Kemp, Implications of the Military Buildup in Non-Industrial Areas. The Western downgrading of the military, political and economic significance of these facilities when lost, was attributed by some sceptics to "sour grapes". The author is from another school of thought. He argued that in the ICBM age that little tactical or strategic advantage could be gained from the retention of overseas bases as "the button could be pushed in Washington".

12. A.S. Becker and A.L. Horelick, Soviet Policy in the Middle East. The authors tended to support the views expressed by Kemp but pointed out that under conditions of near or actual nuclear parity, bases again assumed a significant role.

13. R.E. Harkavy, The New Geopolitics: Arms Transfers and the Major Powers' Overseas Basing Networks. Carried the argument for bases on from "the traditional geo-strategic concerns" to incorporate more and more scientific needs of satellite monitoring, electronic surveillance, sophisticated intelligence acquisition and related technical functions.

14. P.Y. Hammond, The Cold War Years: American Foreign Policy Since 1945. Provides a comprehensive review of anti-Soviet alliances formed to implement Western "rimland strategy".

15. M. Bar-Mohar, Suez: Ultra Secret. To place this situation in military perspective, the author provides a very good review of the Tripartite Agreement (and the Near East Arms Coordinating Committee (NEACC) which strictly controlled the flow of arms into the area. The restrictions, which included prohibition of third party sales of items which had British, French or United States components, caused Nasser to seek an arms source free from NEACC control (pp. 72/143).

16. I. Belyayev, MZh, No. 9. In relating this situation to the Middle East, Belyayev argued the Soviet view that the imperialist powers manipulated both the Arabs and the Israelis. They kept the progressive Arab states occupied in a state of war with Israel, thereby ensuring that progressives could not effectively influence, or bring about social change in, the traditional Arab states. This permitted the West to maintain right-wing dictatorships in power and thereby maintain control of area political, economic and military developments (p. 155). In effect, Belyayev argued that a state of "no war - no peace" was in Western interests.

17. U.S. Department of State, United States Policy in the Middle East: September 1956-June 1957. The tendency to write-off the possibility that the USSR might take any action which could have led to direct confrontation with the United States or its allies, contributed to general astonishment regarding the Soviet initiative. By Western estimates, the USSR lacked both the military capability and the economic capacity to enter into the business of providing arms to traditional Western clients. When the situation in Egypt escalated to the point of threats (Marshall Bulganin, as reported in Izvestiya of 6 November 1956) to launch "nuclear rockets", the Department of State dismissed the Soviet threat as "bravado", emphasized US military superiority and submitted that under such conditions of imbalance "no nation is going to press the button if it means national suicide", (p. 18). The latter estimate was not tested; operations against Egypt ceased largely because of US pressures. However, the tendency to use Western estimates of Soviet capabilities to determine the possible courses of action available to the USSR and through mirror-image to attribute Western value judgements to the Soviet decision-makers continued.

18. J.D. Glassman, Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and War in the Middle East. Glassman, in reviewing the Suez situation some eighteen years later, concludes on the apparent basis of the same evidence as the State Department that should a military exchange have taken place, "it would have been fatal to the Soviet Union", (p. 9). The fact that Khrushchev had acted on the basis of a Soviet evaluation of comparative capabilities and on what, in Soviet opinion, may have constituted a viable deterrent against US nuclear attack did not appear to merit consideration.

19. A.I. Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy. The primacy of Egypt in Soviet Middle East policy, during the period 1952-58, is well documented (p. 1/20).

20. "The History of Soviet-Egyptian Relations", The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXVII, No. 43. Provides the Soviet interpretation of its policies relating to Egypt.

21. R.E. Hunter, Adelphi Papers, No. 59. Hunter argues effectively that the West created the situation which was ideal for Soviet exploitation (p. 6).

22. D.R. Coughlin, The Congressional Record. Provides details of the continuing arms agreements between the USSR and client states.

23. SSSR Ministerstvo Vneshei Torgovli, Vneshniaia Torgovlia SSSR. Provides a Soviet record of related agreements.

24. J.C. Campbell, The Soviet Union and the Middle East. Concludes that "Soviet influence gained steadily from the mid-50's until it was firmly implanted in a number of Arab countries and had largely displaced the West ..." (p. 11).

25. A.S. Becker and A.L. Horelick, Soviet Policy in the Middle East. Suggests that the action initiated by the USSR primarily as a spoiling or denial policy changed into an extension of traditional Tsarist efforts to establish long term Russian footholds in the Middle East (pp. 10/13).

26. D. Cook, New York Herald Tribune, 8 December 1966. The writer admitted that although "he did not know if it was by grand design", it was nevertheless obvious "that Russia is moving in where old imperialism has moved out" (p. 12).

27. A. Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration. The break up of the colonial system and the emergence by 1962 of 105 new "independent" states provided the USSR with the opportunity to establish positions of influence in areas to which Soviet access had been previously denied.

28. I. Bronin, MEMO, No. 9. The Soviet author stated flatly that the USSR could not tolerate the continued existence of Western alliances, of imperialist bases and an unchallenged Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. The resolution of these issues were a prerequisite to the essential easing of tension between the superpowers.

29. N.S. Khrushchev, Le Figaro, 27 March 1958. By 27 March 1958, Khrushchev was able to say (even before the changes in Iraq and the collapse of the Baghdad Pact) that "the concept of the complete encirclement of our country required more accurate definition ... the world had changed drastically and the socialist countries can no longer be considered isolated islands in the rough capitalistic sea". More was yet to come.

30. The term "iron curtain", introduced by Churchill to describe Soviet constraints imposed to preclude entry into and exist from Soviet controlled territory, appears equally applicable to the series of Western alliances and military installations which were designed to contain Communist expansion. The Russian authors made periodic references to the Allied "curtain of steel", but apparently on direction ceased and began to use derogatory remarks along the lines of the subsequent Chinese use of "paper tiger".

31. D.J. Dallin, Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy 1939-42, (p. xv).

32. S.L. Sharp, The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, (pp. 108/109). The only other author I have found to bring this point to light.

33. P.H. Juviler and H.W. Morton, Soviet Policy Making - Studies of Communism in Transition, (p. 6).

34. R. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (p. 4).

35. Ibid., (p. 68).

36. Ibid., (p. 74).

37. W.Z. Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East, (pp. 261/262). The emphasis is mine.

38. W.Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, (pp. 1/3).

39. W.Z. Laqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union and the Middle East 1958-1968, (p. 1).

40. Ibid., (pp. 3/4). The emphasis is mine.

41. A.L. Horelick, The Study of Soviet Foreign Policy: A Review of Decision - Theory - Related Approaches, (pp. 50/56).

42. Milestones of Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1967.

43. R.H. McNeal, Guide to the Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1917-1967.

44. W.Z. Laqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union and the Middle East 1958-1968. Note Bibliography for Soviet content.

45. F.D. Kohler, Soviet Strategy for the Seventies, (p. 6).

46. F.D. Kohler, Understanding the Russians, (p. 6). The emphasis is mine.

47. W.C. Clemens Jr., Soviet Union, Vol. 3, Part I, (pp. 124/125).

48. Ibid., (p. 126).

49. T.H. Rigby, Policy Making in the U.S.S.R. 1953-61. The point was made by the Honorary Secretary of the Australian Political Science Studies Association in the Preface.

50. Ibid., (p. 32).

51. W.C. Clemens Jr., Soviet Policy in the Developing Countries, (p. 313).

52. R.D. McLaurin, The Middle East in Soviet Policy, (p. 3).

53. V.I. Gauptman, MZH, (p. 73).

54. M.V. Senin, Hemtsy i Europa, (pp. 18/19).

55. I.E. Kravtsev, Proletarskii internationalizm otechestvo i patriotzim, (pp. 3/4).

56. W.Z. Laqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union and the Middle East 1958-1968, (p. 2). "The interests of Russia as a great power have played a role in Soviet foreign policy from its earliest days and was of course inevitable".

57. E.H. Luttwak, Commentary, Vol. 63, No. 3, (pp. 51/58). Concludes that "Russian imperial strategy has already emerged fully formed in the classic mould".

58. D. Vital, The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power - Great Power Conflict, (p. 75). "The security photia of both the Imperialist and Communist leaders results in similar policies".

59. R. Pipes, The U.S.S.R. and the Middle East, (p. 28). "... under either Russian or Communist rule, the first objective of their foreign policy ...".

60. P. Meyer, Readings in Russian Foreign Policy, (p. 678).

61. G.A. Arbatov, Ideologicheskaia bor'ba v sovremennykh mezhdunarodnykh otnoshoniakh, (p. 425).

62. K. London, The Soviet Impact on World Politics, (p. vii).

63. Ibid., (p. 200).

64. F. Griffiths, Genoa Plus 51: Changing Soviet Objectives in Europe, (p. 61).

65. F.D. Kohler, The Soviet Union and the October War: The Implications for Detente, (pp. 124/125).

66. G. Jukes, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defense, No. 14, (pp. 43/44). Emphasis is mine.

67. A.W. Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence. This view is projected throughout the book.

68. A.T. Bouscaren, Soviet Foreign Policy - A Pattern of Persistence, (p. 114).

69. Y. Ro'i, From Encroachment to Involvement: A Documentary Study of Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1945-73, (p. xxii).

70. V.M. Molotov, Problems of Foreign Policy, (p. 42).

71. A. Eden, London Times, 8 March 1955.

72. N.I. Bulganin, Soviet Weekly, 12 February, 1955.

73. P. Meyer, Reading in Russian Foreign Policy, (p. 679).

74. E. Crankshaw, Khrushchev Remembers, (p. vii).

75. R. Kolkowicz, The U.S.S.R. and the Middle East, (p. 80).

76. H.A. Kissinger, International Politics and Foreign Policy, (p. 271).

77. E.V. Rostow, The New Republic, 5 April 1976, (p. 29).

78. H.S. Dinerstein, Fifty Years of Soviet Foreign Policy, (p. 7).

79. R. Pipes, The U.S.S.R. and the Middle East, (pp. 22/23).

80. H.A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, (p. 85).

81. P. Meyer, Readings in Russian Foreign Policy, (p. 667). As quoted by Meyer.

82. R. Lowenthal, The Observer, 13 May 1956.

83. R. Pipes, The U.S.S.R. and the Middle East, (p. 15).

84. J.C. Campbell, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, (p. 12).

85. R.Z. Rubenstein, The Middle East, 1974: New Hopes, New Challenges, (pp. 64/85).

86. K. London, The Soviet Impact on World Politics, (p. 272).

87. E. Taborsky, Communist Penetration of the Third World.

88. V.V. Aspaturian, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 1, (p. 8).

89. G.A. Arbatov, The War of Ideas in Contemporary International Relations: The Imperialist Doctrine, Methods and Organization of Foreign Political Propaganda. Anti-Soviet bias is brought out in each of the Soviet reviews of Western publications and political statements.

90. G. Andreev, MZH, No. 4, (p. 6).

91. V. Israelyan, Soviet Foreign Policy: A Brief Review 1955-65.

92. M. MccGwire, Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Contraints, (p. vi).

93. M.S. Cline, World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift, (p. 123).

94. V. Israelyan, Soviet Foreign Policy: A Brief Review 1955-65, (pp. 42/43).

95. L.L. Whetten, The Soviet Presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, (p. 44).

96. R. Lowenthal, Survival, Vol. XIV, No. 1, (p. 3).

97. V. Sorza, The Guardian, 8 June 1967.

98. Institute of Philosophy of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. Problems of War and Peace - A Critical Analysis of Bourgeois Theories, (p. 267).

99. E. Crankshaw, Khrushehev Remembers, (pp. vii/viii).

100. E. Taborsky, Communist Penetration of the Third World. Taborsky takes an extreme good/evil approach and lumps all Communist foreign activities as directly subordinate to Soviet control, making no effort to differentiate for example between conflicting Soviet and Rumanian policies vis a vis Israel.

101. B.G. Gafurov, Politika SSha na Arabskom vostoke. As editor of a collection of Soviet articles pertaining to United States foreign policy, Gafurov demonstrated careful selectivity to substantiate the preconception of evil.

102. A.A. Grechko, Kom, No. 4, (p. 40).

103. Institut-Ekonomika, Politika-SSha, (p. 24).

104. I. Zhilin, International Affairs, No. 12, (p. 24).

105. A. Arbatov, Stroitel'stvo kommunizma i mirovoi revoluitsionnyi protsess, (pp. 119/133).

106. R. Conquest, Survey, Summer/Autumn 1976, (p. 39).

107. F.D. Kohler, Soviet Strategy for the Seventies, (p. 11).

108. F.D. Kohler, Understanding the Russians, (pp. xxv/xxvi).

109. A. Solzhenitsyn, Survey, Summer 1975, (p. 130).

110. Y. Ro'i, From Encroachment to Involvement: A Documentary Study of Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1945-73, (p. xxviii).

111. P.H. Juviler, Soviet Policy Making - Studies of Communism in Transition, (p. vii).

112. R.L. Garthoff, Military Strategy: Soviet Doctrine and Concepts, (p. xxi).

113. W.A. Williams, The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, (p. 255 and p. 274).

114. L. Schapiro, The Soviet Impact on World Politics, (pp. 7/8).

115. M. Schwartz, The Failed Symbiosis: The U.S.S.R. and Leftist Regimes in Less Developed Countries, (p. 35).

116. H.A. Kissinger, International Politics and Foreign Policy, (p. 274).

117. L.I. Brezhnev, Monitoring Service of the B.B.C., (p. 8).

118. V. Israelyan, Soviet Foreign Policy: A Brief Review 1955-65, (pp. 37/38).

119. H.S. Dinerstein, Fifty Years of Soviet Foreign Policy, (p. 5).

120. A.B. Ulam, The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, (p. 136).

121. R.V. Daniels, op. cit., (p. 155).

122. G.G. Pendill Jr., op. cit., (p. 93).

123. Ibid., (p. 92).

124. P.H. Juviler, Soviet Policy Making - Studies of Communism in Transition, (p. vi).

125. W.Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, (p. 18).

126. B. Moore Jr., Soviet Politics - The Dilemma of Power, (p. 351).

127. J.C. Campbell, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, (p. 12/13).

128. W. Joshua, Arms for the Third World: Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy, (p. 1).

129. R.E. Hunter, Adelphi Papers, No. 59, (p. 2).

130. M.H. Kerr, The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June 1967: An Arab Perspective, (pp. vii/viii).

131. Defined by The Concise Oxford Dictionary to be descendants of Shem including Hebrews, Arameans, Phoenicians, Arabs and Assyrians. Here used in the increasingly common but incorrect narrow sense of anti-Jewish.

132. M.H. Kerr, The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June 1967: An Arab Perspective, (p. viii).

133. G.W. Ball, Foreign Affairs, No. 3, (p. 453).

134. Ibid., (p. 454).

135. I. Miller, Priorities for Peace in the Middle East, (pp. 138/141).

136. D. Sufran, op. cit., (pp. 138/141).

137. M. Vilner, Pravda, 7 October 1973.

138. Hussein Speaks, (p. 14).

139. W.E. Griffith, Survival, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, (pp. 1/9).

140. W.E. Griffith, Soviet-American Regional Competition 1976 - Part II The Middle East and the Great Powers, (pp. 19/20).

141. G.W. Ball, Foreign Affairs, No. 3, (pp. 453/471).

142. J. Donovan, U.S. and Soviet Policy in the Middle East 1945-56, (p. 71).

143. F. Utley, Will the Middle East Go West?, (p. 1).

144. A.S. Protopopov, Sovietskii Soiuz i Suetskii krizis 1956 Goda, (p. 88).

145. Z. Brzezinski, World Politics, Vol. IX, No. 1.

146. F.D. Holzman, Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East, (p. 104).

147. W. Joshua, Soviet Penetration into the Middle East, (p. v and p. 2).

148. L. Tolkunov, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXVI, No. 30.

149. K. London, Soviet Impact on World Politics, (p. 280).

150. BGen. E.L.M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, (p. 74).

151. C.I. Aboltin, Mezhdunarodnya Ezhegodnik: politika i okonomika, (p. 17).

152. K. Issa, Soviet Policy in the Middle East After the October War, (pp. 1/19).

153. E.V. Rostow, International Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 2. Rostow holds that without a Soviet presence in the area that the confrontation between the Israelis and the Arabs would have been long resolved. He cautions the Arabs that association with the USSR can only bring further military defeats.

154. W. Joshua, Soviet Penetration into the Middle East, (p. vii).

155. A.S. Becker, Soviet Policy in the Middle East, (p. v).

156. W.Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, (p. 175).

157. W.Z. Laqueur, Nasser's Egypt, (p. 11).

158. A. Eden, Full Circle: The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden, (p. 245).

159. G.S. McClellan, The Middle East in the Cold War, (p. 31).

160. A.S. Klieman, Studies in International Affairs, No. 19, (p. 21).

161. D.A. Dragunskii, Pravda, 27 February 1970.

162. S. Krylov, Taynoe oruzhie sionizma, (pp. 1/163).

163. K. Ivanov, Gosudarstov Izrail: Evo polozhenie i politika, (pp. 1/216).

164. B.A. Hazan, Soviet Propaganda - A Case Study of the Middle East Conflict, (p. 149).

165. A.A. Said, The Soviets in Asia, (p. 106).

166. A. Arbatov, Stroitel'stvo kommunizma i mirovi revoluitsionnyi protsess, (pp. 269/279).

167. R.O. Freedman, Soviet Economic and Political Relations With The Developing World, (pp. 100/134).

168. B. Ponomarev, KOM, No. 15.

169. O. Eron, U.S.S.R. and the Middle East.

170. S. Constant, The Daily Telegraph, 11 January 1963.

171. W.W. Kulski, The Soviet Union in World Affairs: A Documented Analysis 1964-72, (p. 150).

172. M. Kapitsa, MZH, No. 7, (p. 14).

173. I. Abu-Lughod, The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June 1967: An Arab Perspective, (p. ix).

174. E.W. Said, Arabs Today: Alternatives for Tomorrow, (p. 7).

175. E.W. Said, The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June 1967: An Arab Perspective, (p. 4).

176. L. Awad, Arabs Today: Alternatives for Tomorrow, (p. 65).

177. H. Sharabi, op. cit., (p. 140).

178. E.W. Said, op. cit., (p. 7).

179. J. Berque, op. cit., (p. 9).

180. E.W. Said, The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June 1967: An Arab Perspective, (pp. 1/2).

181. G.W. Ball, Foreign Affairs, No. 3, (pp. 456/460).

182. Ibid., (p. 461).

183. J. Gaspard, The New Middle East, (pp. 15/19).

184. S. Hoffman, Survival, Vol. XVII, No. 4, (p. 174).

185. S. Friedlander, Arabs et Israeliens, (pp. 138/181).

186. Y. Evron, Middle East Conference, Cornell University, 21-23 April 1977.

187. A. Wohlsteller, Survey, Vol. 22, No. 314. Although the author quotes Orwell in the context decision-making relative to comparable military capabilities, no words seem more applicable in relation to material issued by vested interests in the Middle East.

188. W.W. Kulski, The Soviet Union in World Affairs: A Documented Analysis 1964-72, (p. ix).

189. D. Vital, The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power-Great Power Conflict, (p. 75).

190. W.A. Glaser, World Affairs Quarterly, Vol. XXVII, No. 1.

191. A. Dallin, Soviet Conduct in World Affairs - A Selection of Readings.

192. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, New Trends in Kremlin Policy, (pp. 1/33 and pp. 149/168).

193. H.S. Dinerstein, Fifty Years of Soviet Foreign Policy, (p. 4).

194. A.A. Zhdancv, Rech!

195. M.D. Shulman, World Politics, (pp. 566/582). Shulman quotes Kennan's article which appeared as "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", Foreign Affairs, XXV, No. 4, Washington, July 1947.

196. Z. Brzezinski, Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics, (p. 163).

197. Ibid., (pp. 161/163).

198. F.D. Kohler, Soviet Strategy for the Seventies, (p. 6).

199. A. Atherton, Proposed Sales to Jordan of the Hawk and Vulcan Air Defence Systems.

200. Institute for the Study of Conflict, Soviet Objectives in the Middle East.

201. E.H. Heikal, The Road to Ramadan.

202. Soviet Jewish Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1.

203. T.T. Hammond, The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers.

204. S. Merlin, The Big Powers and the Present Crisis in the Middle East, (p. 55).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aboltin, V.I. (ed.), Mezhdunarodnyi ezhegonik: politika i ekonomika, Moscow: Iz. Politicheskoi Leteratury, 1967.

Abu-Lughod, Ibrahim, "Preface", The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June 1967: An Arab Perspective, Abu-Lughod, I., (ed.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.

Andreev, G., "V.I. Lenin i miroliubivaia sovestskaia vneshniaia politika", (V.I. Lenin and the Peace-loving Soviet Foreign Policy), MZh, No. 4, Moscow, 1970.

Arbatov, A., Stroitel'stvo kommunizma i mirovoi revoluitsionnyi protsess, Moscow: Iz. Nauka, 1966.

Arbatov, G.A., Ideologicheskaia bor'ba v sovremennykh mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniakh, (The Ideological Struggle in Contemporary International Relations), Moscow: Iz. Politicheskoi Literatury, 1970.

Arbatov, G.A., The War of Ideas in Contemporary International Relations: The Imperialist Doctrine, Methods and Organization of Foreign Political Propaganda, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973.

Ardalan, Manoutcher, Iran's Domestic and Foreign Policy, Excerpts from speeches and interviews of his Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Aryamehr Shahanshah of Iran. Washington, D.C.: Imperial Embassy of Iran, August 1976.

Aspaturian, Vernon V., "The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex - Does it Exist?", Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 1., London: 1972.

Atherton, Alfred., Proposed Sales to Jordan of the Hawk and Vulcan Air Defence Systems, House Committee on International Relations, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975.

Atkeson, Edward B., "Hemispheric Denial: Geopolitical Imperatives and Soviet Strategy", Strategic Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, Washington, D.C.: Spring, 1976.

Awad, Lewis, "The Arab Society, Possibility of Dialogue - The Egyptian Experience", Arabs Today: Alternatives for Tomorrow, Association of Arab-American University Graduates, (ed.), Columbus, Ohio: Forum Associates Inc., 1973.

Ball, George W., "How to Save Israel in Spite of Itself", Foreign Affairs, No. 3, New York: April 1977.

Bar-Zohar, Michel, Suez: Ultra-Secret, Paris: Fayard, 1964.

Becker, Abraham S. and Arnold L. Horelick, Soviet Policy in the Middle East, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1970.

Belyayev, I, "Kemu vygodno zatiagivanie konflikta na Blizhnem Vostoke?" (For Whom is it Profitable to Prolong the Middle East Conflict?), MZh, No. 9, Moscow: 1969.

Berque, Jaques, "Predicament and Perspectives of the Arab World", Arabs Today: Alternatives for Tomorrow, Association of Arab-American University Graduates, (ed.), Columbus, Ohio: Forum Associates Inc., 1973.

Bouscaren, Anthony T., Soviet Foreign Policy - A Pattern of Persistence, New York: Fordham University Press, 1962.

Brezhnev, L.I., "Award to Tula: Brezhnev on Foreign Policy", Monitoring Service of the B.B.C., London: 19 January 1977.

Bronin, I., "Problemy Sredizemnomoria i imperialisticheskaia strategiia", (The Problems of the Mediterranean and Imperialist Strategy), MEMO, No. 9, Moscow: September 1971.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, (ed.), Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1969.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, "The Politics of Underdevelopment", World Politics, Vol. IX, No. 1, New York: October 1956.

Bulganin, N.I., "Speech", Soviet Weekly, Moscow: 12 February 1955.

Burns, LGen E.L.M., Between Arab and Israeli, Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Co., 1962.

Burton, J.W. (ed.), Non-Alignment, London: Andre Deutsch, 1966.

Calvocoressi, Peter, (ed.), Suez - Ten Years After, New York: Pantheon Books, 1967.

Campbell, John C., "The Continuing Crisis", The Soviet Union and the Middle East, Lederer, Ivo J. and Wayne S. Vucinich, (eds.), Stanford California: Hoover Institution Press, 1974.

Campbell, John C., "Soviet Policy in the Middle East", Soviet Economic and Political Relations with the Developing World, Kanet, Roger E. and Donna Bahry, (eds.), New York: Praeger, 1975.

Campbell, John C. and Helen Caruso, The West and the Middle East, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Inc., 1972.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, New Trends in Kremlin Policy, Washington, D.C.: August 1970.

Clemens Jr., Walter C., "Soviet Policy in the Third World in the 70's: Five Alternative Futures", Soviet Policy in the Developing Countries, Duncan, R.W., (ed.), Waltham, Mass.: Rand, 1970.

Clemens Jr., Walter C., "Simulation in Soviet Studies", Soviet Union, Vol. 3, Part I, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1976.

Cline, Ray S., World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 1975.

Collier, Basil, The Lion and the Eagle, New York: Putman's Sons, 1972.

Conquest, R., "Relating to Russia", Survey, London: Oxford University Press, Summer/Autumn 1976.

Constant, Stephan., "Moscow in the Middle East", The Daily Telegraph, London, 11 January 1963.

Cook, Don, "Russia and the Middle East", New York Herald Tribune, New York: 8 December 1966.

Coughlin, Lawrence R., The Congressional Record, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 16 September 1969.

Crankshaw, Edward, "Forward", Khrushchev Remembers, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970.

Dallin, Alexander, (ed.), Soviet Conduct in World Affairs - A Selection of Readings, New York: Columbia University Press, 1960.

Dallin, David J., Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy 1939-42, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942.

Dallin, David J., Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott and Company, 1961.

Daniels, Robert V., "Doctrine and Foreign Policy", The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, Hoffman E.R. and F.J. Fleron Jr., (eds.), New York: Aldine-Atherton, 1971.

Dawisha, A.I., Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy, London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1976.

Dinerstein, Herbert S., Fifty Years of Soviet Foreign Policy, Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1968.

Donovan, John, (ed.), U.S. and Soviet Policy in the Middle East 1945-56, New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1972.

Dragunskii, D.A., "Sionizm - Imperialichiskaia instrument", (Zionism - the Imperialist Tool), Pravda, Moscow: 27 February 1970.

Dulles, Allen W., The Craft of Intelligence, New York: Harper and Row, 1973.

Eden, Anthony, Full Circle: The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden, London: Cassel & Co., 1960.

Eden, Anthony, "The Threat", London Times, London: 8 March 1955.

Eron, Oded, "Perception of Arab Communism", U.S.S.R. and the Middle East, Confino and Shamir, (eds.), New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973.

Evron, Yair, Participant, Middle East Conference, Ithaca: Cornell University, 21-23 April 1977.

Freedman, Robert O., "The Soviet Union and the Communist Parties of the Arab World: An Uncertain Relationship", Soviet Economic and Political Relations with the Developing World, Kanet, Roger E. and Donna Bahry, (eds.), New York: Praeger, 1975.

Friedlander, Saul and Mahmaud Hussein, Arabs et Israeliens, Paris: Ed. au Seuie, 1974.

Gafurov, B.G., (ed.), Politika SShA na arabskom vostoke, (US Policies in the Arab East), Moscow: Gospolitzdat, 1961.

Gankovsky, Yuri V., Seminar, Ottawa: Carleton University, 7-9 December 1977.

Garthoff, Raymond L., "Introduction", Military Strategy: Soviet Doctrine and Concepts, Sokolovsky, Marshall V.D., (ed.), New York: Praeger, 1963.

Gaspard, J., "Feisal's Arabian Alternative", The New Middle East, Beirut: March 1969.

Gauptman, V.I., "Klassoyi kharakter sovremenennykh mezhdunardnykh otnoshenii", (The Class Character of Contemporary International Relations), MZh, No. 9, Moscow, 1969.

Glaser, William A., "Theories of Soviet Foreign Policy: A Classification of the Literature", World Affairs Quarterly, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, Washington, D.C.: April 1956.

Glassman, Jon D., Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and War in the Middle East, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1975.

Grechko, A.A., "Kommunischkiya parti Sovetskaya Sousya i vooruzhennykh sil", (The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Armed Forces), KOM, No. 4, Moscow: 1971.

Griffith, William E., "Soviet Influence in the Middle East", Survival, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, London: I.I.S.S., January/February 1976.

Griffith, William E., Soviet-American Regional Competition 1976 - Part II: The Middle East and the Great Powers, Cambridge, Mass.: 8 November 1976.

Griffiths, Franklyn, Genoa Plus 51: Changing Soviet Objectives in Europe, Toronto: C.I.I.A., 1973

Hammond, Paul Y., The Cold War Years: American Foreign Policy Since 1945, New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1969.

Hammond, Thomas T. and Robert Farrell, (eds.), The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975.

Harkavy, Robert E., The New Geopolitics: Arms Transfers and the Major Powers' Overseas Basing Networks, Paper presented at 21-23 April 1977 Cornell Conference, Ithaca: 23 April 1977.

Hazan, Baruck A., Soviet Propaganda - A Case Study of the Middle East Conflict, Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House Jerusalem Ltd., 1976.

Heikal, M.H., The Road to Ramadan, London: Collins, 1975.

"The History of Soviet-Egyptian Relations", The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXVII, No. 43, Columbus: Ohio State University, 19 November 1975.

Hoffmann, Stanley, "A New Policy for Israel", Survival, Vol. XVII, No. 4, London: I.I.S.S., July/August, 1975.

Holzman, Franklyn D., "Soviet Trade and Aid Policies", Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East, Hurewitz, J.C., (ed.), New York: Praeger, 1969.

Horelick, A.L., A. Ross Johnson and John D. Steinbruner, The Study of Soviet Foreign Policy: Decision - Theory - Related Approaches, London: Sage, 1975.

Hunter, Robert E., "The Soviet Dilemma in the Middle East, Part I: Problems of Commitment", Adelphi Papers, No. 59, London: I.I.S.S., September 1969.

Hussein Speaks, Amman, Jordan: Ministry of Culture and Information, February 1973.

Institut - Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologika, Politika - SShA, (U.S. Policy), Moscow: IEPI, February 1971.

Institute of Philosophy of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Problems of War and Peace - A Critical Analysis of Bourgeois Theories, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972.

Institute for the Study of Conflict, Soviet Objectives in the Middle East, London: I.S.C., The Eastern Press Ltd., March 1974.

Israelyan, V., (ed.), Soviet Foreign Policy: A Brief Review 1955-65, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967.

Issa, Khairy and Ahmed Youseff, Soviet Policy in the Middle East After the October War, Cairo: International Symposium, 27-31 October 1975.

Ivanov, K.,i Z. Sheinas, Gosudarstvo Izrail: Ego polozhenie i politika, (The Israeli Government: Its Status and Policies), Moscow: MO., 1959.

Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977.

Joshua, Wynfred, Soviet Penetration into the Middle East, New York: National Strategy Information Center Inc., 1971.

Joshua, Wynfred and Stephen P. Gilbert, Arms for the Third World; Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy, Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1969.

Jukes, Geoffrey, "The Development of Soviet Strategic Thinking Since 1945", Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defense, No. 14, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1972.

Juviler, Peter H. and Henry W. Morton, (eds.), Soviet Policy Making - Studies of Communism in Transition, New York: Praeger, 1967.

Kapitsa, M., "National'no - osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie i raskol'necheskaia deiatel'nost gruppy Mao", (The National-Liberation Movements and the Dissenting Activity of the Group of Mao), MZh., No. 7, Moscow, 1967.

Kemp, Geoffrey, "The New Strategic Map: Geography Arms, Diffusion and the Southern Seas", Implications of the Military Buildup in Non-Industrial Areas, Fletcher School Conference, Boston: 6-8 May, 1968.

Kerr, Malcolm H., "Foreword", The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June 1967: An Arab Perspective, Abu-Lughod, I., (ed.), Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1970.

Khrushchev, N.S., "Encirclement", Le Figaro, Paris: 27 March 1958.

Kissinger, Henry A., American Foreign Policy, New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1974.

Kissinger, Henry A., "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy", International Politics and Foreign Policy, Rosenau, James N., (ed.), New York: The Free Press, 1969.

Klieman, Aaron S., "Soviet Russia and the Middle East", Studies in International Affairs, No. 19, Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1970.

Kohler, Foy D., Understanding the Russians, New York: Harper and Row, 1970.

Kohler, Foy D,, Mose L. Harvey, Leon Gouré and Richard Soll, The Soviet Union and the October War; The Implications for Detente, Miami: University of Miami, 1974.

Kohler, Foy D., Mose L. Harvey, Leon Gouré and Richard Soll, Soviet Strategy for the Seventies, Miami: University of Miami, 1973.

Kolkowicz, Roman, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East", The U.S.S.R. and the Middle East, Confino and Shamir, (eds.), New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973.

Kravtsev, I.E., Proletarskii Internationalism, Otechestvo i Patriotzim, (Proletarian Internationalism, the Fatherland, and Patriotism), Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1955.

Krylov, S., Taynoe Oruzhie Sionizma, (Zionism's Secret Weapon), Moscow: Voennoe Izdatelstvo SSR, 1972.

Kulski, W.W., The Soviet Union in World Affairs: A Documented Analysis 1964-72, Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1973.

Laqueur, Walter Z., Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East, London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1957.

Laqueur, Walter Z., The Soviet Union and the Middle East, London: Praeger, 1959.

Laqueur, Walter Z., The Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union and the Middle East 1958-1968, London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1969.

Laqueur, Walter Z., Nasser's Egypt, Weidenfeldt and Nicolson, London: 1957.

London, Kurt, "Summary and Conclusions", The Soviet Impact on World Politics, London, Kurt, (ed.), New York: Hawthorne Books, Inc., 1974.

London, Kurt, (ed.), The Soviet Impact on World Politics, New York: Hawthorne Books Inc., 1974.

Löwenthal, Richard, "Continuity and Change in Soviet Foreign Policy", Survival, Vol. XIV, No. 1, January/February 1972.

Löwenthal, Richard, "Russia's Price", The Observer, London: 13 May 1956.

Luttwak, Edward N., "Defense Reconsidered", Commentary, Vol. 63, No. 3, New York: March 1977.

Merlin, Samuel, (ed.), The Big Powers and the Present Crisis In the Middle East, Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Presses Inc., 1968.

Meyer, Peter, "The Driving Force Behind Soviet Imperialism", Readings in Russian Foreign Policy, Goldwin, Robert A., G. Stourzh and M. Zetterbaum, (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, 1959.

Milestones of Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1967, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967.

Miller, Rabbi Israel, Testimony to the U.S. Congress, Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 94th Congress, Priorities for Peace in the Middle East, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975.

Molotov, V.M., Problems of Foreign Policy, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1949.

Moore Jr., Barrington, Soviet Politics - The Dilemma of Power, New York: Harper and Row, 1965.

McClellan, Grant S., (ed.), The Middle East in the Cold War, New York: H.W. Wilson Co., 1956.

MccGwire, M., Ken Booth and John McDonnell, (eds.), Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints, New York: Praeger, 1975.

McLaurin, Ronald D., The Middle East in Soviet Policy, Toronto: D.C. Heath and Company, 1975.

McNeal, Robert H., Guide to the Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1917-1967, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972.

Pendill Jr., Grant G., "Bipartismanship in Soviet Foreign Policy-making", The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, Hoffman, E.R., and F.J. Fleron Jr., (eds.), New York: Aldine-Atherton, 1971.

Pipes, Richard, "Some Operational Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy", The U.S.S.R. and the Middle East, Confino and Shamir, (eds.), New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973.

Ponomarev, B., "Aktualnye Problemy Teorii Mirovovo Revolutsionnovo Protsessa", (The Actual Problems in the Theory of the World Revolutionary Process), KOM, No. 15, Moscow: 1971.

Protopopov, A.S., Sovetskii Soiuz i Suetskii Krizis 1956 Goda, (The Soviet Union and the Suez Crisis of 1956), Moscow: Izadtel'stvo Nauka, 1969.

Rigby, T.H. and L.C. Churchward, Policy Making in the U.S.S.R. 1953-61, Melbourne: Lansdowne Press, 1962.

Ro'i, Yaacov, From Encroachment to Involvement: A Documentary Study of Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1945-73, New York: Halstead Press, 1974.

Rostow, Eugene V., "Where Kissinger Went Wrong: A Basis for Peace", The New Republic, 5 April 1976.

Rostow, Eugene V., "The Middle Eastern Crisis in the Perspective of World Politics", International Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 2, London: April 1971.

Rubenstien, Alvin Z., Testimony to the U.S. Congress, Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 93rd Congress, The Middle East, 1974: New Hopes, New Challenges, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974.

Safran, Nadav, Testimony to the U.S. Congress, Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 94th Congress, Priorities for Peace in the Middle East, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975.

Said, Abdul A., "Discussion", The Soviets in Asia, Dodge, Norton E., (ed.), Mechanicsville, M.D.: Cremona Foundation, 1972.

Said, Edward W., "Introduction", Arabs Today: Alternatives for Tomorrow, Association of Arab-American University Graduates, (ed.), Columbus, Ohio: Forum Associates Inc., 1973.

Said, Edward W., "The Arab Portrayed", The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June 1967: An Arab Perspective, Abu-Lughod, I., (ed.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.

Schapiro, Leonard, "Totalitarianism in Foreign Policy", The Soviet Impact on World Politics, London, Jurt, (ed.), New York: Hawthorne Books, Inc., 1974.

Schwartz, Morton, The Failed Symbiosis: The U.S.S.R. and Leftist Regimes in Less Developed Countries, California: Arms Control and Foreign Policy, May 1973.

Senin, M.V., Nemtsy i Europa, (The Germans and Europe), Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1968.

Sharabi, Hisham, "Unity, Disunity, Fragmentation in the Arab World", Arabs Today: Alternatives for Tomorrow, Association of Arab-American University Graduates, (ed.), Columbus, Ohio: Forum Associates Inc., 1973.

Sharp, Samuel L., "National Interest: Key to Soviet Politics", The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, Hoffman E.R. and F.J. Fleron Jr., (eds.), New York: Aldine-Atherton, 1971.

Shulman, Marshall D., "Changing Appreciation of the Soviet Problem", World Politics, Princeton, N.J.: July 1950.

Solzhenitsyn, A., "Speech by Alexander Solzhenitsyn to the AFL-CIO", Survey, London: Oxford University Press, Summer 1975.

Soviet Jewish Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1, London: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1975.

SSSR Ministerstvo Vneshei Torgovli, Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR, (Foreign Trade - USSR), Moscow: Mezdunarodnye Otnasheniia, 1955-75.

Taborsky, Edward, Communist Penetration of the Third World, New York: Speller and Sons, 1973.

Tolkunov, L., "The Near East: Two Tendencies", The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXVI, No. 30, Columbus, Ohio: 21 August 1974.

Ulam, Adam B., "Soviet Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy", The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, Hoffman, E.R. and F.J. Fleron Jr., (eds.), New York: Aldine-Atherton, 1971.

U.S. Department of State, United States Policy in the Middle East: September 1956 - June 1957, Washington, D.C., U.S.: GPO, 1957.

Utley, Freda, Will the Middle East Go West?, Chicago: Regnery, 1957.

Vilner, M., "Politika obrechenn'i na neudachu", (A Policy Doomed to Failure), Pravda, Moscow: 7 October 1973.

Vital, David., The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power-Great Power Conflict, London: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Whetten, Lawrence L., The Soviet Presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, New York: National Strategy Center Inc., 1971.

Williams, William Applemor, "The Cold War Revisionists", The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, Hoffman, E.R. and F.J. Fleron Jr., (eds.), New York: Aldine-Atherton, 1971.

Wohlsteller, Albert, "Racing Forward? Or Ambling Back?", Survey, Vol. 22, No. 314, London: Summer/Autumn 1976.

Wölfers, Arnold, Discord and Collaboration, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1962.

Zhdanov, A.A., Rech', (Speech), Moscow: Gospolitizat, 1947.

Zhilin, I., "Coexistence", International Affairs, No. 12, Moscow: December 1973.

Zorza, Victor, "Kremlin: Exercise in Moderation", The Guardian, London: 8 June 1967.

ABBREVIATIONS- SOVIET SOURCE DATA

Kommunist	KOM.
Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia	MEMO.
Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn'	MZh.
Mezhdunarodnaia Otnosheniia	MO.
Izdatel'stvo	Iz.